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Let me start with a reminiscence: a few weeks ago, I was sitting in one of my
preferred cafés in Paris, le Café Odéon- Théâtre de l’Europe, a vivid place near
the Jardin de Luxembourg in the heart of the university quarter. I realised that the
waiter was wearing a shirt with the letters ‘Defend Paris’, which he explained to be
a statement against the forces that make Paris an uneasy place to live, a defiance
against the powerful and social injustice. With a mixture of rebellion and idealism,
he added that he understands himself as part of a ‘Reclaim Your City’ Movement,
thus representing what is central for urban citizenship today: a republican defence
against forces that make a metropolitan city a trademark to be sold to people who
can afford it, but increasingly less a home for ordinary people who want to live
in the city. Walking through the streets, passing a small jewelry shop, a place of
distinguished understatement showing a picture of Meghan Markle wearing ‘rose’-
earrings displayed in the window, the term ‘zombie urbanism’ came to my mind – a
term used by Jonny Aspen, professor at the Institute of Urbanism and Landscape
in Oslo (See Bjerkeset and Aspen (forthcoming 2020) and here), to describe a
cliché-like way of dealing with urban environment by developers and designers
– a ‘staged urbanism’, in which urban features are used as a means for selling,
marketing and branding. This kind of city-marketing can prove quite successful:
whereas the burning of Notre Dame mobilised hundreds of millions of donations
within a short period of time, the burning of the National Museum in Rio de Janeiro
soon after, extinguishing 200 years of documentation of cultural memory, mobilised
only 225.000 Euros (state 1.4.2019).
Global metropolitan cities like Paris are certainly extreme cases – but they raise
the question: How can this ‘staged urbanism’ provide spaces of urban citizenship?
Under what conditions can urban citizenship “contribute to overall democratic
integration within and beyond nation-states”, as Rainer Bauböck expects?
Why urban citizenship?
Bauböck relates his initiative of strengthening urban citizenship to the rise of
populism. He rightfully calls for new narratives that can bridge the divide between
mobile/sedentary, urban/rural, cosmopolitan/parochial populations and identities.
This divide – which is frequently referred to as the new ‘globalisation cleavage’ –
should indeed be considered the primary challenge a citizenship narrative has to
address today. Under conditions of rising inequities among regions and states,
urban and rural areas, and polarisation of labour markets with certain strata of the
population being stuck in unqualified jobs and few possibilities to move ahead,
traditional legitimation narratives have lost their resonance. We witness a “populist
moment” which comes along with phantasms of homogeneity and embodiment that
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openly attack the pluralist constitution of modern democracy (including right-wing
anti-migration propaganda contributing to reinforcing new border practices, see
Varsanyi; cf. Krastev 2007.). ‘The People’ has become a central concept in political
discourse again but, as many liberal analysts argue, it is often brought forward
in a way that is deeply conflicting with emancipatory aspirations of democratic
citizenship. However, there are also movements on the rise that try to conceive
of populism in a progressive way. Far from being a perversion of democracy, it is
supposed to constitute the political force to recover it and expand it on the different
levels of society (Mouffe 2018).
Rainer Bauböck is appealing to the emancipatory idea of democratic citizenship:
the narrative he is searching for ought to tell people “what they have in common
and why they have to respect each other as equals who share a stake in institutions
that express their common desire for democratic self-government”. Where Marshall
argued for social citizenship to meet the demands of the postwar-era, and Kymlicka
developed the concept of multicultural citizenship to answer the challenges of
growing diversity in the 1990ies, today the idea of urban citizenship is supposed
to address the concerns of those most affected by the globalisation divide. Urban
citizenship must be at the core of the new story.
Who is the urban citizen?
In Bauböck’s view, urban citizenship should be part of a multilevel institutional
architecture of democracy. Consequently, urban citizenship ought to be part of
a multilevel form of citizenship. It thus seems important to keep in mind that the
different levels of democratic self-government ought to be pervaded by a political
culture expressing values of equal worth, respect and cooperation, not only within
the boundaries of one level but also transcending each of them. The challenge
for urban citizenship as part of a multilevel citizenship regime is the construction
and legitimation of new frames of reference while at the same time including equal
rights empowering subjects for collective action and developing a self-understanding
as a citizen. What is more, the political culture of democracy stands in systemic
tension with a social culture of capitalism with its values of competitiveness, merit
and individualising of achievements. While the social culture of capitalism produces
differences in status and wealth, i.e. social inequalities, the political culture of
democracy requires to ‘stand eye to eye with fellow citizens’ (Pettit 1997, 51).
Normatively, citizenship claims to be a generalisable ideal, but insofar as its social
foundations are misinterpreted, its effects become exclusionary (Marx (1843) 1976).
The political citizen then turns out to be an economic citizen (‘bourgois’) – which
historically meant: a male white property owner.
It has frequently been criticised that citizenship as a privilege for the propertied
classes is enjoying a resurgence. This resurgence is discussed not only in the
literature on neo-liberal transformations of the welfare state, but also on multiple
citizenship (Anderson 2015, 184-85; Morris 2003, 2009; Tanasoca 2018 (and the
discussion at GLOBALCIT)). In the context of debates about the ‘global city’, urban
culture and the dynamics of gentrification the argument is taken up by demonstrating
that the ‘new global cleavage’ is, at least partly, linked to the old social cleavages.
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But the forces that bring about these cleavages are reorganized (Sassen 2008,
503-511).
Three dimensions of meaning
I generally agree with Rainer Bauböck’s assumption that urban citizenship must be
at the core of a new citizenship narrative. But the construction of this new democratic
narrative raises a bunch of questions: The concept of urban citizenship implies three
dimensions of meaning, which complicates addressing the challenge: first, the idea
refers to a certain space: the city, as a particular locus for action; second, it refers
to a certain social situatedness: being mobile and looking for a new home in the big
cities; and third, it refers to a certain mindset: a post-national identity, embracing
open societies and cultural diversity. How do these dimensions matter with regard to
the task of re-integrating democracy?
Regarding the scenes, the spaces, on which the history of modern citizenship is
projected forward today, the city is certainly playing an extraordinary role (Colliot-
Thelene 2011, 218-232). Enfolding dynamics of enlargement refer to the language
of human rights as a medium of including more and more categories of persons
into the realm of citizenship, frequently giving rise to practices of “insurgent
citizenship” (Holston 2008). But local struggles are deeply entangled with the
economic logic of a globalising world. De-territorialisation and pluralisation of power
make it increasingly more difficult to figure out a clear addressee for claims to equal
citizenship.
Regarding the social situatedness of ‘movers’ rather than ‘stay at homes’, cities are,
no doubt, also of ultimate importance. Cities are primary goals of destination for
those seeking a new beginning, not least due to the fact that metropolitan regions
are economic centers which potentially give more opportunities for making a living.
But one should be careful to avoid homogenisation. The idea of a globalisation
cleavage of moving versus sedentary parts of the population suggests a cleavage
between city and periphery. But the clash is also within the city. Not only should
we take more care on how non-urban communities are portrayed, as Patti Lenard
suggests, but also on how the contradictions of globalisation are mirrored in the
diversity of urban population.
This links to the last dimension, the post-national mindset, which is allegedly
fostered by urban citizenship. A “ius domicilii”, derived from presence in locality and
including all de facto residents, would be an important normative shift with regard to
democratic inclusion. It would allow inhabitants with multiple affiliations and loyalties
to identify with the city as the concrete locus of their everyday life and thus support
multiple experiences of identity. But urban citizens cannot be expected to carry the
burden of reintegrating democracy alone.
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Connecting the local and the global
Cities today are crucial places where the ambivalences of globalisation come to
light. In the post-national constellation, the global city has become the locus for a
reconstitution of citizenship, creating new forms of politics and practices of collective
agency. The concentration of global economic and cultural dynamics in the city
reinforces the search for innovative responses. Nevertheless, the contradictions
of globalisation cannot be worked through on the local level alone. Although the
city potentially creates concrete forms of solidarity based on local cooperation,
these forms of solidarity must be linked to a transnational citizenship regime which
supports the egalitarian promises of modern democratic citizenship. Restricting “ius
domicilii” to the local level would intensify the conflicts it is supposed to mediate
if not embedded in wider transformations. Contrary to what Bauböck suggests,
the normative shift to a residence-based membership should therefore (graduated
according to the minimum time of residence) be perceived as the appropriate
foundation of membership in the post-national constellation in general, including at
the national level.
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